In Zimbabwe the supreme court recently
clarified the position on Labour law. They ruled that under common law
employers and employees are equal before the law. Now a lot of people have been
asking me about the case and I realised that people are confused and are not
sure what that means. So I will explain in detail the whole thing. Some were
asking why the employees in the case can't appeal. So for people to understand
I will begin from the facts of the case and also explain the law fully.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE[4]
The
case was an appeal from a judgment of the Labour Court delivered on 28 March
2014 allowing termination of the appellants’ employment contracts on notice.
The facts of this case are as follows. The appellants were employed by BP Shell
as supply and logistics manager and finance manager before BP Shell sold its
services to Zuva Petroleum, the Respondent. The appellants were transferred to
the new undertaking without derogation from the terms and conditions of
employment that they enjoyed when they were under BP Shell. In November 2011
the Respondent offered its employees, including the Appellants, a voluntary
retrenchment package which was declined. Following the refusal of the voluntary
retrenchment package in December 2011, the Respondent served each of its
employees, including the Appellants, with a compulsory notice of intention to
retrench. The appellants and the respondent could not agree on the retrenchment
terms.
However,
the parties failed to agree on the terms of retrenchment leading to a referral of
the dispute to the Retrenchment Board. As a result, in May 2012 the Ministry of
Labour and Social Services directed the parties to carry out further
retrenchment negotiations for another twenty-one days. Before the expiry of the
twenty-one days, the respondent wrote letters to the appellants, terminating
their contracts of employment on notice, as was provided for in the contracts
of employment signed by both parties, with effect from 1 June 2012. The respondent paid the appellants cash in
lieu of notice and thus terminated the employment relationship. The
appellants approached a labour officer, contending that their employment
contracts had been unlawfully terminated. The labour officer failed to resolve
the matter and referred it to compulsory arbitration. The arbitrator concluded
that the termination of the contracts of employment was unlawful because the
appellants had not been dismissed in terms of a code of conduct. The respondent
appealed to the Labour Court. In its judgment on the appeal, the Labour Court
had this to say: “In my view, therefore,
the submission that section 12B came to do away with the possibility of
terminating a contract of employment on notice is a misunderstanding of the law
as it stands. In any event, the provisions of section 12(4) of the Act are
clear and allow no ambiguity as also the provisions of section 12B. None of the
sections have the effect of doing away with the termination of a contract of
employment on notice.” In essence, the Labour Court came to the conclusion
that neither section 12B nor section 12(4) of the Labour Act abolished the
employer’s right to terminate employment on notice[5]. The Supreme Court agreed
with this assertion by the Labour Court.
The
appellants, as expected were aggrieved by the judgment of the Labour Court and
appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds[6] that the Labour Court
erred and seriously misdirected itself on a question of law by upholding the
termination of the appellants’ contracts of employment on notice and failing to
find such termination to be unfair dismissal. The Appellants further argued
that the Labour Court erred and seriously misdirected itself on a question of law
in failing to realize as it should have done that section 12(4) of the Labour
Act [Chapter 28:01] does not provide for the termination of a contract
of employment on notice and that any such purported termination is contrary to
section 12B of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. Further the Appellants stated that the Labour
Court erred at law in allowing termination on notice as that amounts to
allowing an employer to terminate employment for no justifiable and valid
cause. The appellants thus sought the setting aside of the Labour Court
judgment and its substitution with that of the arbitrator from the Supreme
Court.
PROVISIONS OF THE LABOUR
ACT IN QUESTION
SECTION 12 B
Section
12B (1) of the Labour Act states that; “every
employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed.”The same section, at
subsection (3) lays out the instances whereby an employee is said to have been
unfairly dismissed. An employee is deemed to have been unfairly dismissed if;” the employee terminated the contract of
employment with or without notice because the employer deliberately made
continued employment intolerable for the employee;” or “if, on termination of an employment contract
of fixed duration, the employee— (i) had a legitimate expectation of being
re-engaged; and (ii) another person was engaged instead of the employee.”
SECTION 12(4)
Section
12 (4) of the Labour Act is structured as follows: “Except where a longer
period of notice has been provided for under a contract of employment or in any
relevant enactment, and subject to subsections (5), (6) and (7), notice of
termination of the contract of employment to be given by either party shall be—
(a)
three months in the case of a contract without limit of time or a contract for
a period of two years or more;
(b)
two months in the case of a contract for a period of one year or more but less
than two years;
(c)
one month in the case of a contract for a period of six months or more but less
than one year;
(d)
two weeks in the case of a contract for a period of three months or more but
less than six months;
(e)
one day in the case of a contract for a period of less than three months or in
the case of casual work or seasonal work.”
These
are the provisions of the labour Act that were under scrutiny or as some called
it; these were the labour laws under trial at the Supreme Court.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION BY
THE SUPREME COURT
The
Supreme Court stated that it appeared on the papers of the case that the bone
of contention between the parties was the legal status of the employer’s common
law right to terminate an employment relationship on notice. The Judge noted
both Counsels (L Madhuku for the Appellants and Advocate T Mpofu for the
Respondent) were in agreement that; “…once
upon a time both the employer and the employee had a common law right to
terminate an employment relationship on notice. The point of departure appears
to be that the appellants, while acknowledging that the employer’s right once
existed, argue that it has since been abolished. The respondent contends that the
employer’s right has not been abolished and still subsists[7].”
The
appellants contended that section 12B of the Labour Act abolished the
employer’s common law right to dismiss an employee on notice. The appellants,
in paragraph 2 of their heads of argument, made the submission that;”In enshrining the concept of unfair
dismissal in section 12B, the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] is outlawing any termination of employment for no
reason. Accordingly, the purported termination of the appellant’s contracts of employment
was unlawful on account of being a contravention of section 12B of the Labour
Act [Chapter 28:01][8].”On the other hand, the
respondent argued that the common law right to dismiss an employee on notice
has not been abolished by s 12B of the Act and is extant. The respondent
further argued that s 12(4) of the Act reinforces its contention that that
right exists, and that the section regulates the exercise of the right.
The
critical issue for determination by the Supreme Court in this matter was therefore
what meaning should be ascribed to section 12B and 12(4) of the Act. In particular,
the Supreme Court had to determine whether section 12B of the Act, on a proper
reading of that section, abolishes the employer’s common law right to terminate
employment on notice.
THE JUDGMENT
Determination on the
provisions of Section 12 B
In
the judgment Chidyausiku CJ said that; “As
I have already stated, it is common cause that once upon a time both the
employer and the employee had a common law right to terminate an employment
relationship on notice. That common law right in respect of both the employer
and the employee can only be limited, abolished or regulated by an Act of
Parliament or a statutory instrument that is clearly intra vires an Act of Parliament. I am satisfied that section
12B of the Act does not abolish the employer’s common law right to terminate
employment on notice in terms of an employment contract for a number of reasons.”(Emphasis
mine)
The
Chief Justice made reference to the time-honoured and golden rule of statutory
interpretation which states that one should give the words of a statute their
primary meaning. Applying this golden rule of statutory interpretation, the
court held that the words in section 12B of the Labour Act neither expressly
nor by necessary implication abolish the employer’s common law right to
terminate an employment relationship by way of notice. The court also referred
to the principle of statutory interpretation which states that a statute cannot
effect an alteration of the common law without saying so explicitly. To reinforce this principle , the court cited
with approval the case of Phiri and Ors v Industrial Steel Pipe (Pvt)
Ltd[9],
wherein it was stated that ;“There is a
presumption, in the interpretation of statutes, that Parliament does not intend
a change in the common law, unless it expresses its intention with irresistible
clearness or it follows by necessary implication from the language of the statute
in question that it intended to effect such alteration in the common law; for
‘construing the statute by adding to it words which are neither found therein
nor for which authority could be found in the language of the statute itself,
is to sin against one of the most familiar rules of construction[10]…..”
In
interpreting the provisions of Section 12B of the Labour Act, the court stated
that as the main heading of that section reveals, it only deals with dismissal
and the procedures to be followed in those instances where an employment
relationship is to be terminated by way of dismissal following misconduct
proceedings. The court held that termination of employment on notice is not
among the conduct that section 12B of the Act outlaws as unfair labour practice.
The court also referred to Section 8 of the Labour Act which deals with unfair
labour practices by the employer. Since termination on notice is not among the
unfair labour practices in that section, the court stated that it is apparent
that termination of employment on notice is not among the conduct outlawed by section
8 of the Act.
In
addition, the court held that a proper reading of section 12B of the Act
reveals that the section deals with the method of termination of employment
known as “dismissal” which is not the only method of terminating an employment
relationship as there are several methods of terminating employment. Based on
that the court held that; “the
appellants’ case is predicated on the proposition that dismissal means all forms
of termination of employment. Put differently, all terminations of employment
are dismissals. This proposition is not tenable on the authority of the above
cases. That proposition is clearly erroneous.” The court further held that
the proposition that an employer has a right to terminate an employment
relationship on notice in circumstances other than dismissal for misconduct
finds further support in the case of Gertrude Kwaramba v Bain Industries (Pvt) Ltd[11], where it was held that
an employer has the right to terminate the employment contract on notice in no
fault situations. This was the same reasoning in the case of Chirasasa
and Ors v Nhamo NO and Anor [12] where the court held
that; “In this case, the appellants
agreed that there was no act of misconduct alleged against them. The parties
had failed to agree on the new terms and conditions of employment proposed by
the second respondent to meet the operational requirements of its business. The
second respondent had a right to terminate the contracts of employment with the
appellants by giving them one calendar month’s notice and could exercise it
without obtaining prior written approval of the Minister. The decision in Kwaramba’s case supra is, in my view, correct ...”
Based
on this the Chief Justice held that; “I
am satisfied s 12B of the Act does not deal with the general concept of
termination of employment. It concerns itself with termination of employment by
way of dismissal in terms of a code of conduct. It sets out that which must be
followed or done in terms of either an employment code of conduct or a national
code of conduct. It does not concern itself with termination of employment by
ways other than dismissal[13].”
Determination on the
provisions of Section 12 (4)
The
Court held that the wording of section 12(4) of the Act is so clear that it
leaves very little room, if any, for misinterpretation. Section 12 (4) governs
the time periods that apply when employment is being terminated on notice as
shown above. The court held that it stands to reason that the notice periods do
not apply when an employee is dismissed because in instances of dismissal no
notice is required. The court had this to say; “The periods of notice referred to in section 12(4) of the Act can only
apply where there is termination of employment in terms of a process involving
the giving of notice provided for in a contract of employment.” The learned
judge accepted the appellants’ contention that section 12(4) of the Act does
not create a right to terminate employment on notice. The respondent also
agreed with this contention stating that the right to terminate employment on
notice is created by common law and not by statute or section 12(4) of the Act.
The respondent contended that section 12(4) of the Act simply regulates the
exercise of that right conferred on the employer by common law. As such the
court held that Section 12(4) of the Labour Act explicitly applies to both the
employer and the employee stating that; “There
is no possible explanation, and none has been advanced, why, despite the
explicit language of the section, it should apply to the employee only and not
to the employer; or why the section should exist to regulate a non-existent
right….The presumption is that
Parliament must be taken to have intended its enactments to have meaning.”
Consequently
the Supreme Court held that Section 12(4) of the Act can only have meaning if
there is a substantive right. in this case the Court held that the substantive
right to which section 12 (4) pertains
is the common law right to terminate
employment on notice; “This is
especially so when one considers that all that section 12(4) of the Act does is
to facilitate the exercise of an existant common law right. It is for these reasons that I agree with the
conclusion of the Labour Court that the respondent was entitled at law to give
notice terminating the employment of the appellants in terms of the contracts
of employment between the parties. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby
dismissed with costs[14].”
GARWE JA; HLATSHWAYO JA and GUVAVA
JA were all in agreement with the Chief Justice meaning that the Judges
unanimously agreed that the common law position which places employers and
employees on an equal footing in terms of termination on notice is still
operational. This effectively means that employers can now terminate the
contracts of employment they have with their employees without giving any
reason and without any retrenchment packages.
THE AFTER EFFECTS OF THE
CASE
Within
moments of delivery of the judgment in the Don Nyamande case, the case had already
gone viral in Zimbabwe. Legal experts warned that the case threatened job
security in Zimbabwe as employers now could terminate the employees’ contracts
of employment without using retrenchment procedures. Some people even wondered
why law students in the universities are still learning labour law if the
labour laws are as unfair as this. Some also argued that all the employees in
Zimbabwe who are permanent have been reduced to temporary workers in light of
this judgment. Reports by the media suggest that a lot of employees have been
laid off work after the Supreme Court ruling in this case showing that
employers are taking advantage of this ruling. Even before the Supreme Court
had delivered judgment on the Don Nyamande case, employers were already
terminating the employees’ contracts of employment on notice basing on the
Labour Court judgment. Nemukuyu[15] reported that several
companies had abandoned the normal retrenchment procedures in favor of the
cheaper way of terminating contracts on notice. Investigations by the Herald
revealed that Unifreight Limited laid off at least one hundred employees using
the Labour Court’s ruling that an employer can terminate a contract on notice
in the same case of Don Nyamande and that China-Africa Corporation had
terminated twenty contracts in the same fashion[16].
“Court
ruling costs 700 jobs in 5 days” reads the Herald[17] headline just days after
the Supreme Court delivered judgment in the Don Nyamande case. These are indeed
shocking statistics in a country that is faced with employment problems and whereby
a lot of people are currently unemployed. It is reported that Government had to
hold a crisis meeting for stakeholders during which workers proposed that the
Presidential Powers be invoked to protect them amid reports that over 700
people have lost their jobs in less than five days following the ruling. The
ruling has indeed shaken the labour industry leaving many jobless and clueless
as to what to do next. The Tripartite Negotiating Forum has come up with a
report on the judgment, the implications and possible remedies. On the remedies,
the Forum proposed two schools of thought with the first school of thought
suggesting that the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare
should come up with a Statutory Instrument that protects employees in terms of
section 17 of the Labour Act. The Forum suggests that the Minister of Labour
should recommend to the President to invoke his Presidential Powers so that the
implications of the judgment can be dealt with to help those that have already
been terminated from employment[18].The Minister of Labour
said that while employers had a right to decide their future, it was not proper
for employers to suddenly cut off an employee’s contract with no benefits after
serving the same company for several years; “Put yourself in the shoes of somebody who had been working for 20 to 25
years and suddenly without reason, they are told in three months you are off…No,
we need to look at that and we are going to take appropriate action[19].”
Some people are of the view that the scales of justice must be
evenly balanced between both employers and employees. What is extremely
important to note is that mostly it is employees who terminate contracts of
employment on notice usually on 24 hour notice and employers are left with
little or no remedy as the cost of litigating far exceeds the damage suffered
by an abrupt departure from employment[20]. Proponents
of this argument of equality between employer and employee say that this case
has brought about a turning point in that the employer is also at liberty if
done within the confines of the law to terminate a contract of employment on
notice[21]. Labour
laws tend to favor the employee leaving the employer with little redress or no
redress whatsoever as shown by the above scenario. It is noted that this may be
a critical school of thought and necessary intervention from the judiciary that
is awake to the harsh economic environment in which employers are operating in[22] as was
acknowledged in the case of Zimbabwe
International Trade Fair Company v Viking Plastics (Private) Limited &
Another[23]
whereby the court held that;“Economic challenges, liquidity
crunch, viability problems, competition – the list is not exhaustive for these
and other phenomena which have conspired to hamstring a lot of business entities
in this country with the consequent result of threatening their very existence.
Too ghastly to contemplate are the possible consequences.”
It is also posited that the challenge in the view taken by the
court n the Don Nyamande case is that it may be construed as constituting a
material departure from the concept of rules of natural justice that define our
employment jurisprudence[24]. A key
ingredient of such being the right to be heard before adverse decisions are
taken against an employee. The question now that boggles the mind is could
termination of a contract of employment be exercised without regard to the
principle of natural justice expressed in the maxim audi alteram partem rule[25]? The
audi rule is a common law principle which has been applied by courts
in proceedings as part of rules of natural justice, to grant an opportunity to
be heard to persons whose rights, liberty, property, or legitimate expectation
have been adversely affected. The question arises as
to whether these two positions are parallel to each other or simply speak the
same language. That is, when a contract of employment is terminated on notice
by either party it remains what it is, a contract, a commercial transaction, from
which either party to it may choose to withdraw. This position finds ample
legal support in the case of Printing Registering Co v Sampson[26]where
it was stated that; “If there is one
thing which more than any other public policy requires, it is that men of full
age and competent understanding shall have utmost liberty of contracting, and
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held
sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore you have this
paramount public policy to consider-that you are not lightly to interfere with
this freedom of contract.”
THE LEGAL POSITION
The
ruling in the Don Nyamande case has indeed caused a lot of outrage and shock. But,
is the judgment really as shocking as it is made out to be? Especially among
the lawyers and others who know the law. Surely the learned colleagues know
that law is law regardless of its goodness or its badness. Law is law while its
fairness, morality and justice is another thing. So the Supreme Court judges
merely interpreted the law as it is. However, such a reaction can be understood
in light of the fact that Zimbabwean labour law jurisprudence has always been
inspired by tenets of natural justice and has always protected the workers. However,
this is not the first time that such a judgment as this one has been handed
down by our court. In the case of Gertrude Kwaramba v Bain Industries[27],
the court held that an employer has a right to terminate the employment
contract on notice in no fault situations.
This case was followed in Chirasasa and Ors v Nhamo NO and Anor[28] where the court held that: “In
this case, the appellants agreed that there was no act of misconduct alleged
against them. The parties had failed to agree on the new terms and conditions
of employment proposed by the second respondent to meet the operational
requirements of its business. The second respondent had a right to terminate
the contracts of employment with the appellants by giving them one calendar
month’s notice and could exercise it without obtaining prior written approval
of the Minister.”
The
position at common law is that both the employer and employee have the right to
terminate a contract of employment on notice. Employers felt that they were
being treated unfairly as under Zimbabwean jurisprudence this right seemed to
have been extended to employees only. As the judges correctly interpreted this
rule of common law is still operational. Under statutory interpretation, there is a presumption that a statute is not
supposed to alter existing law beyond what is clearly stipulated either
expressly or impliedly in the statute itself. Existing law includes both the common law and statute law.
This means wherever possible statutes should
be interpreted in conformity with existing law.
The court will not easily assume that a statute was meant to alter the
existing law beyond what is clearly provided for in the said statute. Where there are two possible interpretations
to a statute, one that results in the alteration of the existing law and the
other which would be harmonious with the existing law the court should adopt
the latter. However, where the only reasonable interpretation is that the
legislature intended to alter the existing common law or an existing statute,
then the presumption does not apply.
The legislature may make express indication in
the statute that the law is being altered or such intention may be implied. In
the Don Nyamande case therefore , the court was supposed to interpret the
Labour Act under the presumption that the legislature does not intend to change
common law unless it expressly says so as was stated in the case of Phiri
and Ors v Industrial Steel Pipe (Pvt) Ltd (referred to above) ; “There
is a presumption, in the interpretation of statutes, that Parliament does not
intend a change in the common law, unless it expresses its intention with
irresistible clearness or it follows by necessary implication from the language
of the statute in question that it intended to effect such alteration in the
common law; for ‘construing the statute by adding to it words which are
neither found therein nor for which authority could be found in the language of
the statute itself, is to sin against one of the most familiar rules of
construction …”(emphasis mine)The Supreme Court was thus bound by common
law and the legislature has not made any express intention to alter the common
law. Unless and until they do so, the position at common law is that employees
and employers are equal and either of them can terminate a contract of
employment.
In
the interpretation of the law, the court in the Don Nyamande also applied the literal
rule in interpreting the provisions of the labour Act. Under statutory
interpretation there is a Presumption
against injustice or unreasonableness. This presumption states
that the court generally does not have authority to
question the reasonableness or propriety of legislation. So where the words of
a statute are clear and unambiguous and capable of only one meaning, the court,
will normally, give effect to them for such meaning must be what was intended
by the legislature as the court did in the Don Nyamande case. However, where the words of a statute are
capable of two meanings, one meaning which leads to unreasonableness or
injustice while the other does not, there is presumption that the legislature
did not intend the meaning which leads to unreasonableness and injustice.
the judge in the Don Nyamande case expressly stated that; “It is also a well-established principle of statutory interpretation
that a statute cannot effect an alteration of the common law without saying so
explicitly” and cited with approval the
case of Principal Immigration Officer v. Bhula[29] where it was held that; “It has
been repeatedly laid down by this court that where a statute is clear the court
must give effect to the intention of the legislature, however harsh in its
operation may be to individuals affected thereby. Where, however two meanings
maybe given to a section and the one meaning leads to harshness and injustice
while the other does not, the court will hold that the legislature rather
intended the milder than the harsher meaning.”
The
literal rule of interpretation has always been referred to by the courts. The court in Van Heerden v. Queens Hotel (Pvt) Ltd[30] stated that ;“…while
there is always a presumption that Parliament never intended an unreasonable
result, if from the language of the statute it is plain what the intent of the
legislature is, the court must give effect to it, no matter how unreasonable
the result may be. This court has no power to adjudicate on the reasonableness
of an act of Parliament.” In
the case of S
v. Takaendesa[31] the
court said that; “The mere fact that to give the words their
clear and unequivocal meaning may, in certain unforeseen circumstances, cause
inconvenience and hardship is no justification for a court of law assuming the
mantle of the legislature and itself amending the statute. The function of the
court is to declare the law as given by the legislature and not to make it.”
CONCLUSION
The
court in the Don Nyamande case was simply interpreting the law as it is in
Zimbabwe. It now falls on the legislature to amend the provisions of the Labour
Act thereby altering the common law to change the current position that
prevails. The Zimbabwean government indeed operates on the principle of
separation of powers whereby the judiciary, the executive and the legislature
have different functions. The legislature makes law, the executive implements
it and the judiciary merely interprets it in the event of a dispute as it did
in the Don Nyamande case. Now the ball is in the court of the legislature on
whether or not to amend the Labour Act or leave it as it is. The world ,
however, is surely bleak for the Zimbabwean worker as the employee can just be
terminated on notice and can leave the workplace empty handed even after having
worked for the same company for countless years. It is indeed a sad chapter in
the history of Zimbabwe’s labour laws. This brings to mind the times when
slavery existed in the world and slaves had to operate on the mercies of their
master. It is indeed a jungle out there for the workers at the moment. The
Supreme court, hence, correctly and appropriately interpreted the law.
It never rains but it pours for some of the
employees who have had their contracts terminated on notice. Judging from media
reports, a lot of people are now jobless adding on to the countless jobless
people that are already in the market. Some however are of the view that
employers and employees should be on an equal footing and as such employers
should be allowed to terminate the contracts of employment on notice. That is
the freedom of contract after all, they argue. With the current economic
problems that many employers are facing, the ruling is a gift that has been
bestowed upon them by the courts. Most employers are bankrupt and could not
afford to give retrenchment packages to their employees. They now see this as a
chance to lay off workers they were not able to lay off before this ruling for
fear of being sued for unlawful termination. As it stands the doors to sack a
whole lot more workers are ajar and employers are seizing the opportunity with
both hands. It remains to be seen what action the Ministry of labour will take
following the recent developments. It also remains to be seen whether the
Appellants will take the case to the Constitutional Court and challenge the
constitutionality of the law that the Supreme Court relied on.
[1]
Madhuku L: An Introduction to Law, Weaver Press 2010
[2]
Ibid page 2
[3]
Ibid page 2
[4] DON
NYAMANDE & KINGSTON DONGA V ZUVA PETROLEUM (PRIVATE) LIMITED SC 43/15
[5] DON
NYAMANDE & KINGSTON DONGA V ZUVA PETROLEUM (PRIVATE) LIMITED SC 43/15
[6]
Ibid page 3
[7]
Don Nyamande case above
[8]
Don Nyamande case above at page 4
[9] Phiri and Ors v Industrial Steel Pipe (Pvt) Ltd 1996 (12)
ZLR 45 (S) at 49
[10]
Don Nyamande case above at page 6
[11] Gertrude Kwaramba v Bain Industries (Pvt) Ltd SC 39/01
[12] Chirasasa and Ors v Nhamo NO and Anor 2003
(2) ZLR 206 (S)
[13]
Don Nyamande case above at page 10
[14]
Don Nyamande case page 13
[15]
Nemukuyu Daniel: Hundreds lose jobs as firms flout labour laws, The Herald May
11 2015
[16]ibid
[17]
Chipunza Paidamoyo : Court ruling costs 700 jobs in 5 days, The Herald, June 22
2015
[18]
ibid
[19]Chipunza
Paidamoyo : Court ruling costs 700 jobs in 5 days, The Herald, June 22 2015
[20] A
critical overview of the Labour Court’s decision in Zuva Petroleum (Pvt) Ltd v
Don Nyamande and Another LC/H/195/14 accessed at www.chinawalawchambers.com
[21] A
critical overview of the Labour Court’s decision in Zuva Petroleum (Pvt) Ltd v
Don Nyamande and Another LC/H/195/14 accessed at www.chinawalawchambers.com
[22]
ibid
[23] Zimbabwe International Trade Fair Company v Viking
Plastics (Private) Limited & Another HB 83-13 at
page 1.
[24] A
critical overview of the Labour Court’s decision in Zuva Petroleum (Pvt) Ltd v
Don Nyamande and Another LC/H/195/14 accessed at www.chinawalawchambers.com
[25]
ibid
[26] Printing Registering Co v Sampson, 19 Eq. 462 at
p. 465
[27] Gertrude Kwaramba v Bain Industries (Pvt) Ltd SC 39/01
[28] Chirasasa and Ors v Nhamo NO and Anor 2003 (2) ZLR 206 (S)
[29] Principal
Immigration Officer v. Bhula 1931 AD 323 @ 336-7
[30] Van Heerden v.
Queens Hotel (Pvt) Ltd 1973 (2) SA 14 RAD 16
[31] S v. Takaendesa
1972 (4) 72 (RAD) 77
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